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THE TRANSPACIFIC ROUTE INVESTIGATION:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND SOME MAJOR ISSUES
By

LUCILE SHEPPARD KEYESt

I. INTRODUCTION

T

HE TRANSPACIFIC ROUTE INVESTIGATION proceeding,' now
pending before the Civil Aeronautics Board, is obviously of great importance as a determinant of the future fortunes of the applicant carriers
and the status of airline competition in Pacific markets. The proceeding
also raises issues of more general significance: notably, the problem of
control of rates and fares of international air carriers (especially the possibility of effective regulatory influence by indirect means) and the extreme complexity, uncertainty, and costliness of the process of awarding
major international air routes by an administrative process. In addition,
the historical background of this proceeding represents an important part
of the development of the present United States-flag international route
structure and illustrates the basic policy presumptions and particular governmental machinery which have guided this development. The following
discussion will focus in turn upon the background of the investigation
and some of the major issues involved in it.
II.

HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDING

A. Previous Cases
Though the present investigation was instituted in June, 1965, it is a
direct successor to a similar proceeding begun in 1959, decided upon by
the Board in 1961, and under litigation for more than four years thereafter. Leading up to the earlier proceeding were a series of actions involving attempts by Pan American to obtain authorization to compete directly
with Northwest on the Great Circle route between the United States and
the Orient, an issue under review by the Board from 1954 until 1958.'
Thus the Board has been concerned with the question of additional United
States-flag competition over the Pacific for more than thirteen years. A
brief review of these antecedents will serve to place the present investigation in historical perspective, as well as to raise some interesting questions
regarding the proper role of the President in the regulation of international air transportation by United States carriers.
t Ph.D., Radcliffe, 1948. Editorial Advisor to the Journal.
1Transpacific Route Investigation, CAB Docket No. 16242, 1 Jul. 1966.

'Transpacific

Route Case, 32 C.A.B. 928

(1961).

'Reopened Transpacific Certificate Renewal Case, 26 C.A.B. 481, 486 n.10 (1958):
Since 1954 Pan American's application for Great Circle authority from the Pacific
Northwest has been in process, and on three separate occasions the merits of the
application have been examined by the Board and the President.
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The main components of the present United States-flag air service pattern over the Pacific had been established prior to 1950. Before World
War II, Pan American had pioneered a transpacific route to the Orient
(California-Hawaii-Midway-Wake-Guam-Manila-Macao and Hong Kong)
and one to the South Pacific (California-Hawaii-Canton-New CaledoniaAuckland). In 1946, the Board's decision in the Pacific Case" extended
Pan American's route system to include Tokyo and points in Southeast
Asia and to connect with its transatlantic route in India; making possible
around~the-world service. The carrier's South Pacific route was extented
to Australia. The same decision authorized Northwest to serve Tokyo,
Manila, and certain northern Asiatic cities from the Pacific Northwest
and other points on its domestic system, including Chicago and New York.
It was intended that Northwest would connect at Shanghai with TWA's
extended transatlantic route through Bombay to form a second United
States-flag around-the-world service. This plan, of course, failed to materialize, and a subsequent attempt to substitute Manila as a connection
point' has proved to be commercially unsuccessful. Also in 1946, United
was certified to serve Hawaii from California;' and some two years later
both Pan American and Northwest received authority to operate between
Hawaii and the Pacific Northwest.'
Since these early decisions, there has been only one important addition
to the United States-flag Pacific route system. In 1957, Pan American
was authorized to operate between California and Japan via the Great
Circle route.8
This authorization occurred in the midst of Pan American's long campaign for certification to compete directly on Northwest's Great Circle
route to the Orient-a campaign which was chiefly distinguished by an
extraordinary amount of interest on the part of the White House. In
December, 1954, the Board submitted to the President a decision rejecting
Pan American's application for service from Seattle/Portland to Tokyo
via Anchorage. The President did not approve this order, but instead
directed the Board to defer decision on the application." He then requested
that the record be reopened for further consideration of the Pan American
proposal in the light of "new and relevant circumstances or developments;"
accordingly, the record was reopened in January of 1956.10 In 1957, as
has been noted, the Board authorized Great Circle service by Pan Ameri47 C.A.B.

209 (1946).

' Trans World Airlines, Inc., India-Bangkok-Manila Extension, 24 C.A.B. 287 (1956).
' Hawaiian Case, 7 C.A.B. 83 (1946).
'Pacific Northwest-Hawaii Case, 9 C.A.B. 414 (1948); Pacific Northwest-Hawaii Case, 9
C.A.B. 580 (1948). Pan American received this authority by request of the President.
'CAB Order No. E-11648, 3 May 1957, quoted in full in Reopened Transpacific Certificate
Renewal Case supra note 3, at $09.
'Transpacific Certificate Renewal Case, 20 C.A.B. 47, 48 (1955) quotes the President's letter
to the Board on this occasion in part as follows:
I desire to hold in abeyance my decision concerning the use of the great circle route
by Pan American pending further study and later report on the economic and technical feasibility and the military and foreign policy implications of non-stop service
between the West Coast and the Orient.
"'Reopened Transpacific Certificate Renewal Case supra note 3, at 510.
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can between California and Tokyo, but it again refused to permit direct
point-to-point competition with Northwest. The President approved this
decision in August, 1957; however, the following month he requested the
Board to submit to him the "latest statistics of traffic between the United
States and Tokyo"'" and prompted it to reconsider its order. 2 This the
Board did, and reaffirmed its earlier decision the following February
(1958),'a at which time it again pointed out that new competition on
this route would result in an unacceptable amount of diversion of revenue
from Northwest."
While approving this order, the President again asked to be furnished
with recent traffic data on the routes in question, and a year later wrote
to the Chairman of the Board requesting that he "initiate a proceeding
consolidating all Pacific air route matters into a single record and . . .
present its recommendations to [the White House] at the earliest possible
date.""' The Presidential letter read in part as follows:
As you are aware, this Administration is firmly committed to the view that
the public interest requires competitive American flag service at the earliest

feasible date on all international air routes serving major United States gateways. With such competition the benefits to the Nation of international air
transportation-increased trade and friendly relations abroad-become the

greater. Over the North Atlantic our objective has been substantially achieved,
but in the Pacific, because so far it has not been deemed feasible, very little
progress in the desired direction has been made. This history only emphasizes

that the American flag service we ultimately envision for the Pacific must be
developed as rapidly as it can be justified by the growth of United StatesOrient traffic.'"
The recommendations of the Board in the ensuing Transpacific Route
Case included (1) the addition of a new domestic carrier (Western) in
the United States-Hawaii market; (2) award to Pan American of a New
York-Orient Great Circle route via Fairbanks, as well as addition of New
York as a co-terminal on its Central Pacific route; and (3) award to
Northwest of a Central Pacific route between the co-terminal points Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C./Baltimore, Detroit, and
Chicago, the intermediate point Honolulu, and Japan.
In January, 1961, the President rejected all of the Board's major recommendations regarding international services and strongly suggested that
'lid. at 481 n.1.
" Transpacific Route Case supra note 2, at 1166.
"'Reopened Transpacific Certificate Renewal Case supra note 3.

"Id. at 486. The Board stated:
As we explained in great detail in our August 2, 1957, and February 4, 1958,
opinions, grant of Pan American's application would destroy the competitive balance
we are seeking between the two U.S. carriers in the transpacific.*** We regard a
$9 million diversion from Northwest as a vital consideration in view of the carrier's
reported international division operating profit of only $2 million for the year
ended September 30, 1957, and a $751,000 profit in domestic operations. It is obvious
that Northwest is in no position to withstand revenue diversion of the magnitude
that can be expected to result if Pan American is authorized to compete over the
Great Circle route from the Pacific Northwest area.
s"Transpacific Route Case supra note 2, at 1035.
"'Letter from President Eisenhower to Board Chairman James R. Durfee, 18 Feb. 1959, quoted
in Transpacific Route Case supra note 2, at 1034.
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the proposed Hawaiian service should also be abandoned. The following
are key passages from the President's memorandum:
When I requested . . . that this proceeding be undertaken by the Board, I

sincerely hoped it would be possible at the conclusion of the case to provide
greater competition among United States flag carriers in the Pacific.
My review of the record in this case persuades me that our foreign relations
would be adversely affected were we at this time to add second carriers on
our major routes to the Orient. Duplication of service on major routes
presently served by a single carrier means inevitably-as history shows-that
greater United States flag capacity would be offered. This result is made all
the more certain by the advent in recent months of jet service which in
and of itself means greater capacity because much larger and faster aircraft are involved.

Greatly increased capacity-always of considerable concern to other nations engaged in international commercial aviation-should not in my judgment be approved unless traffic forecasts for the routes in question plainly
show that the additional capacity can be absorbed without engendering a
legitimate fear abroad that the United States flag carriers will collect so much
of the traffic as to make service on the route by a foreign carrier economically
untenable or marginal at best ....

* * *1It is reasonable . . . to predict that

approval of the Board's major recommendations in this case would unsettle
our international relations-particularly with Japan which would be faced
with an additional United States carrier on all but one of the now existing
four routes from the United States to Tokyo. 7
Noting that because of Hawaiian statehood he no longer had jurisdiction
over this phase of the proceeding, the President nevertheless expressed his
"hope" that "the Board would reconsider its decision to authorize additional service between the Mainland and Hawaii by a carrier which heretofore has not been engaged in service over the Pacific. At some future
time," he continued, "it may be deemed advisable from every standpoint
to add a second United States carrier on the California-Hawaii-Tokyo
route. The carrier selected-which would presumably be a carrier customarily engaged in international commercial aviation in the Pacificshould also be authorized to carry local traffic between the Mainland and
Hawaii," in order that this carrier should not be unduly handicapped in
competition with Pan American.
At the same time, the President recommended to the Board "that within
the next several years it update the evidence in this case and again consider
the addition of second United States-flag carriers on major routes to the
Orient." Complying with the President's suggestion, the Board withdrew
its approval of Western's Hawaiian application." This action, however, was
contested by the carrier, which in June, 1965, obtained a court decision
holding that the Board's order had not been supported by its findings."
Shortly thereafter, the Board reopened the record on the domestic phase
"

Memorandum for the Chairman, Civil Aeronautics Board, from President Eisenhower, 18 Jan.

1961, quoted in Transpacific Route Case supra note 2, at 976-77.
"Transpacific Route Case supra note 2.
" Western Air Lines, Inc. v. C.A.B., 351 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1965), CAB Order No. E-22314,
I June 1965.
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of the earlier case as a part of the present Transpacific Route Investigation,
initiated at that time in accordance with the President's 1961 recommendations."°
B. The Role Of The President
While the President's disapproval of the international phase of the
Transpacific Route Case may well have been required for the maintenance
of good relations with Japan, it is difficult to justify on foreign policy
grounds his excursion into the realm of domestic regulation. Moreover, it
is at least doubtful that the President's role in the control of international
air transportation by United States-flag carriers should include persistent
prodding of the Board concerning a particular route extension, or the
direction to that agency of broad pronouncements concerning economic
regulatory policy. A stricter adherence to a rule limiting the actions of the
Executive to those clearly essential to the successful conduct of relations
with other nations would at any rate help to dispel suspicions of improper
political interference in the regulatory process."1
C. Overall Policy Towards United States-Flag Competition
Late in 1960, in its initial decision in the Transpacific Route Case, the
Board described and explained the policy which had governed its actions
concerning routes in the transpacific market:
Over the years, the Board, with the approval of the President, has developed
a policy favoring balanced competition between the United States-flag carriers
serving the transpacific area. In order to achieve maximum American-flag
competition against foreign-flag operators and optimum competitive United
States-flag services in the United States-Orient market, the Board's transpacific
policy has been reflected in the establishment of a route system across the
Pacific founded upon a concept of "area" competition as distinguished from
point-to-point competition, except in markets where the traffic volume is
sufficiently great to warrant service by more than one carrier. As traffic has
grown, there has been some enlargement in the markets where direct competion between the American-flag carriers has been authorized. But, by and
large, traffic at major gateways has been primarily designated for one American-flag carrier or the other, without direct duplication of routings. Thus,
under the current route structure, Northwest has the exclusive authority
for providing service between the eastern half of the United States and the
20

In the Matter of the Transpacific

Route Case, CAB Docket No. 7723, CAB Order No.

E-22314, I June 1965.
2 Though doubtless justified
by broad considerations of fairtreatment, a lettersent by the
President to the Chairman of the Board in February, 1966, requesting expeditious treatment of
the Transpacific Route Investigation is perhaps also difficult to explain in terms of foreign relations; a key passage reads as follows:
In view of the present operating rights of B.O.A.C. and Qantas, and the recently
negotiated Bilateral Air Transport Agreement with the Government of Japan, embracing a route to New York and beyond to Europe, it is important that we proceed
quickly to determine whether our transpacific route pattern should be altered so as
to place our carriers in a satisfactory competitive position in the Pacific with foreign
flag carriers operating into the East Coast. (Brief of Northwest Airlines, quoted in
CAB Docket No. 16242 et al., I Sept. 1967.)
Particularly at issue here was Pan American's lack of authority to carry transpacific passengers to New York and beyond, a right which had by that time been conceded to the three foreign
carriers named. The Board subsequently granted this right to Pan American (AvIATION WEEK
& SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 23 Jan. 1967, at 38).
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Orient via the shortest routing; i.e., the Great Circle course. Pan American's
access to the Orient from the Eastern United States is limited to connecting
service over the longer Central Pacific route and a Great Circle routing via
the California gateways of Los Angeles and San Francisco. As to the West
Coast gateways, Pan American has exclusive authority at Los Angeles and
San Francisco, whereas Northwest has primary access to Seattle and Portland
through its exclusive Great Circle routing to the Orient. In the Orient, both
Pan American and Northwest are authorized to serve Tokyo, Manila, and
Hong Kong, but the other points in that area are the exclusive domain of
one or the other carrier, with Northwest operating exclusively into Okinawa,
Taipei, Seoul, and Pusan, and Pan American into Saigon, Singapore, Djakarta,
Bangkok, and Rangoon [Emphasis supplied.]."
As the Board's Bureau of Operating Rights has remarked, the Pacific route
system includes "(1) no point-to-point U.S. flag competition involving
U.S. gateways and (2) limited point-to-point [U.S.-flag] competition in
foreign city-pair markets."' Though both the American carriers are
authorized to operate between Hong Kong and Tokyo and between
Manila and Tokyo, Pan American does not serve the latter route;" and
point-to-point competition between TWA and Pan American is limited
to the Bangkok-Hong Kong market."
Despite the Board's appeal to the principle of "area competition" in
the statement cited above, the context makes it quite clear that there is
no established policy of avoiding point-to-point competition "where the
traffic is sufficiently great to warrant service by more than one carrier,"
or to authorize indirect competition where the traffic will not support it.
Moreover, the extremely light density of traffic on the South Pacific route
resulted in maintenance of a single United States-flag service to this area;
the Board's continued refusal to allow Pan American to duplicate NorthWest's Great Circle route in the 1950's was grounded solidly on "undue
diversion" (that is, on exactly the same reason as that on which the Board
has judged the advisability of new competitive service on domestic routes);
and, in 1960, the Board was willing to authorize a considerable amount
of point-to-point competition on the basis of "economic feasibility.""s
Similarly, there is no reason to believe that the Board deliberately set
out to establish a "carrier system in which one United States-flag carrier
22Transpacific Route Case supra note 2, at 981.

'3Statement of Position and Summary Brief of the Bureau of Operating Rights to Examiner
Robert L. Park, CAB Docket No. 16242 et al., 28 July 1967, at 9.
24ld. at 8.
25
2 Id. at 10.

'Transpacific Route Case supra note 2, at 984:
We are authorizing competitive U.S.-flag service only where it is economically
feasible; e.g., New York, San Francisco, Los Angeles, and Honolulu. At the weaker
gateways (Seattle, Portland, Boston, Philadelphia, Washington, D.C./Baltimore,
Detroit, and Chicago), we are providing direct service only by Northwest.
And at 982:
The primary difficulty that we find in the examiner's decision is that it would
authorize excessive point-to-point competition between Northwest and Pan American
and thereby sacrifice the Board's long-standing policy of area competition. Thus, the
examiner would permit Pan American and Northwest to operate in point-to-point
competition at lesser gateways in both the United States and the Orient where the
volume of traffic is not substantial enough to warrant two-carrier competition
[Emphasis added.].
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has access to world markets on a scale comparable to that of the flag
carriers or combinations of carriers of other major civil aviation powers,
and other United States carriers [are] authorized to served one or more
areas of the world in over-all competition with this carrier.""' Before the
Board came into existence, the foundations had been laid for service by
Pan American on all three major air routes leading out of North America,
and the carrier was operating extensively in Latin America as well as over
the United States-Orient and United States-South Pacific routes. Transatlantic service was initiated by Pan American in 1939. Given the established position of this airline, the present system over the Pacific as well
as elsewhere in the world represents the natural outcome in the international field of the application of policies regarding new services and choice
of carrier similar to those which were (and are) followed by the Board
with respect to domestic air transportation: that is, competition where no
"undue" diversion of revenues from incumbent carriers would result, and
choice of carrier largely by reference to convenient integration into an
existing system.
III.

ISSUES INVOLVED IN THE PRESENT PROCEEDING

As has been seen, the present United States-flag air service in the Pacific
area was planned and established before the advent of jet aircraft, with
the attendant increase in range, speed, and comfort of air transportation
as well as savings in operating cost, which have resulted in a very rapid
expansion of international air traffic in recent years. Table I shows the
remarkable gains in the traffic carrier by United States-flag transpacific
TABLE I
GROWTH IN TRAFFIC OF U.

S. FLAG CARRIERS ON THE PACIFIC

1962-1966

Year

Northwest (International)
Passenger Revenue
Over-all Revenue
Ton-miles
Ton-miles
(Thousands)
(Thousands)

Pan American (Pacific)
Passenger Revenue
Over-all Revenue
Ton-miles
Ton-miles
(Thousands)
(Thousands)

1962

53,892

91,329

222,574

1963

74,366

116,233

261,224

375,466

1964

100,262

159,275

291,238

1965

148,801

235,853

307,182

1966

222,227

371,144

490,597

439,214
586,376
1,013,658

49.3%

57.4%

59.7%

72.9%

Percent increase,
1966 over 1965

330,398

SouRcEs: 1962-1964-Civil Aeronautics Board, HANoooK OF AIR CARRIER STATISTICS, 1965.
1965-1966-Civil Aeronautics Board, AIR CARRIER TRAFFIC STATISTICS, December,
1966.
21Statement on International Air Transport Policy (24 April 1963). This Statement, approved
by the President, was submitted to him by an Interagency Steering Committee composed of representatives of the Federal Aviation Agency, the Bureau of the Budget, the Civil Aeronautics Board,
the Agency for International Development, and the Departments of State, Commerce, and Defense.
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airlines between 1962 and 1966. This upsurge of traffic was cited by the
Board in support of its finding that "the public interest in the development of a sound air transportation system requires the institution of a
'
new transpacific case;" 28
another important basis for this finding was the
very high rate of return earned by United States-flag transpacific air
carriers. In connection with these high rates of return, the Board noted
that it had "found it advisable to urge a reduction in transportation rates
[on the Pacific], although this objective [had] not yet been accomplished.""'
A. Rates Of Return And Attempts At Regulation
Perhaps the most striking feature of United States airline operations on
the Pacific in the immediate past has been their relatively high profitability,
which on many occasions-most recently in September, 1967 3 -has caused
the Board to urge the carriers to lower the level of rates and fares. Even
before the institution of jet service and economy fares on the Pacific, the
TABLE II
RATE OF RETURN ON INVESTMENT'

FoR

UNITED STATES-FLAG TRANSPACIFIC SERVICES
.CALENDAR YEARS 1956-1966

Calendar Year

Pan American
(Pacific)

Northwest
(International)

1956

6.1

10.8

1957
1958

9.1
10.7

23.1
19.1

1959

5.8

13.1

1960

10.4

4.5

Average, 1956-1960

8.4o

14.17o

1961

10.8

13.0

1962

15.7

15.0

1963

21.5

17.8

1964
1965
1966

19.9
18.3
22.0

28.8
35.4
29.8

Average, 1961-19660

18.0%

23.37

Net income before interest as a percent of total investment (excluding investment tax
credits).
2 For the 12 months ended 30 Sept. 1967, rates of return for Northwest (International) and
Pan American (Pacific) are reported at 28.2 and 17.0 percent, respectively.
SOURCES: 1956-1964: International Air Fares, Hearings on H.R. 465 Before the Subcomm. on
Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign
Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 39 (28-29 Apr. 1965).
1965-1966: Civil Aeronautics Board, Air Carrier Financial Statistics, December,
1966.
12 months ended 30 Sept. 1967: AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 15 Jan.
1968, at 49.
2In

the Matter of the Transpacific Route Case, CAB Docket No. 7723, CAB Order No.

E-22314, IS June 1965.
29 Id.
30Agreements by Joint Conference of the International Air Transport Association relating to
North/Central Pacific fares, CAB Docket No. 17828, CAB Order No. E-25666, 11 Sept. 1967.

1968]

TRANSPACIFIC ROUTE INVESTIGATION

Board had twice refused to grant approval of proposed fare increases because of lack of need for revenue in this area.31 Since early 1963, the

Board has again and again pointed out the high level of profits and emphasized the desirability of price reduction." The accompanying table
(Table II, supra) showing rates of return for United States-flag carriers on
the Pacific for the years 1956-1966, affords ample evidence in support of

this position.
As the Board has pointed out, recent average rates of return "compare
very favorably with the 10.125 percent rate of return.., found reasonable
for the major domestic trunkline carriers in the General Passenger Fare
Investigation.3' Although 1965 and 1966 were extremely good years for
international air transport operations in general, rates of return for all
United States-flag international and territorial combination carriers having
averaged 14.7 and 13.8 percent in 1965 and 1966 respectively, these figures
are substantially exceeded by Pan American (Pacific)'s 18.3 and 22.0 percent and Northwest (International) 's 35.4 and 29.8 percent.
3

The Board's exhortations obviously have not been notably successful
in bringing about a level of charges on the Pacific which would produce
rates of return that would be regarded by the Board as reasonable. In fact,
despite the existence of an "open rate" situation in the United StatesOrient market from April, 1963 until fall of 1967 (i.e., a situation in
which no IATA rate agreement was in force), no rate reductions were
initiated in this area during this period until the spring of 1966, when
other important pressures toward reduction had begun to operate. In this
connection, it is interesting to consider the timing of recent price decreases
on the Pacific in the context of other related events. Such decreases have
occurred in May, 1966, January, 1967, and October, 1967. In mid-1965,
the Transpacific Route Investigation was formally instituted by an order
which emphasized the high rate of return earned by the incumbent carriers
as well as the recent rapid growth of traffic in the affected area.' September
of that year saw a recommendation by the Examiner in this investigation
that three supplemental airlines be certificated to provide charter service,
including group inclusive tours and split charters, in the Pacific area.3"
The following March, the Board itself approved domestic inclusive tour
authority for supplemental carriers, and in September granted similar
authority for supplementals in international and overseas service.' By
midsummer, 1967, it had become evident that the strenuous battle being
a"CAB Order No. E-9969, 2 Feb. 1956, and E-13642, 19 Mar. 1959.
2 See, e.g., CAB Order No. E.-19294, 12 Feb. 1963; CAB Order No. E-19385, 18 Mar. 1963;
CAB Order No. E-20533, 2 Mar. 1964; Statement on Transpacific Fares to be Negotiated by
the IATA Traffic Conference at New York, February, 1966; and Tentative Statement of Position
on Fares to be Negotiated at the IATA Honolulu Conference, 24 June 1966.
" CAB Order No. E-19294, 12 Feb. 1963.
34Civil Aeronautics Board, Air !CarrierFinancial Statistics, Dec. 1966.
3'In the Matter of the Transpacific Route Case, CAB Docket No. 7723, CAB Order No.
E-22314, 15 June 1965.
88AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 6 Sept. 1965, at 37.
27AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 31 July 1967, at 29.
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waged to outlaw the new authority by court action was not going to have
the desired serious dampening effect on competition by the supplementals,
at least in the immediate future."
Here, as in other areas of the world, the Board's attempts at direct influence on the level of rates and fares apparently have not been entirely
ineffective; however, it would appear that indirect methods of influence,
through relaxation (or contemplation of relaxation) of barriers to new
competition, have proved to be more successful in bringing about significant price reductions. After all, no one should be surprised to learn
that an agency of an individual national government has not been able
to control prices charged for services provided by carriers of many flags
and involving the interests of many sovereign states. The Board has, of
course, no power to regulate the charges of foreign carriers whose operations are covered by Bermuda-type bilaterals, nor is it likely to receive
such power. Moreover, the Board has no authority to regulate charges for
United States-flag international air transportation, nor is it likely that such
authority could be an effective instrument for the accomplishment of
its aims.3'

B. Precedents For The ConsiderationOf Price Proposals
In A Route Proceeding
It has been suggested that the whole question of rates and fares is out
of place in a route proceeding, and that the consideration of this question

in such a context is contrary to long-standing precedent. However, while
it is true that the emphasis placed on price proposals in the present investigation is certainly unusual,40 it is not unprecedented. In the 1957
Service to Puerto Rico case, 1 Trans-Caribbean's authorization to compete
in scheduled service with incumbent certificated carriers appears to have
been justified largely by the demonstrated willingness and ability of that
carrier (as a supplemental) to provide a viable service on the route in
question at low fares, as compared with the evident reluctance of the

certificated airlines to institute fare reductions.
On at least two occasions, on the other hand, the Board has refused
to give substantial weight to proposed fare reductions, in one instance even
though the applicants making the proposals had been able to provide lowfare service on a nonscheduled basis. The opinion in the Trans-Continental

3s Wall Street Journal, 24 July 1967. However, the Second Circuit and the D.C. Circuit are
in conflict as to approval of the CAB's authorization of these "inclusive tours," and the Supreme
Court has granted certiorari to consider their validity in the case of World Airways, Inc. v. Pan
American World Airways, Inc., 36 U.S.L.W. 3308.
"' See, e.g., Keyes, The Making of International Air Fares and the Prospects for Their Control,
30 J. Ais
'See,

L. & CoM. 173 (1964).
e.g., P. CHERINGTON, AIRLINE PRICE POLICY 450

(1958).

"[T]he Board

rarely gives

"
explicit recognition to the fare policies of a carrier in making route awards....
41 26 C.A.B. 72 (1957). In distinguishing this case from the majority of route proceedings,
the Examiner stated a more traditional position on the matter of rates and fares at 151:
Clearly, no route should be judged solely on the fare representations of competing
applicants since a decision on such a basis would in effect constitute a return to the
unsatisfactory bidding system which preceded the Civil Aeronautics Act. Nevertheless, it must be recognized that the Puerto Rico market is probably more responsive
to low-cost service than any other U.S. market.
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Coach-Type Service Case' seems to lean toward the view that low-fare
services by new entrants should not be authorized if the incumbents are
merely able (but not necessarily willing) to institute comparable fares.'
However, here the rejection of the would-be new entrants was also supported by a conclusion that they had not demonstrated the long-term
viability of their proposals, by evidence that the incumbents were interested in promoting coach-type service, and, above all, by the Board's conviction that excess profits from lucrative routes should be available in
order to support losing services elsewhere." In the other case," the proposals
of the would-be entrant appear to have been decidedly speculative, and
each of the incumbent carriers had "indicated its intent to propose coach
service if and when it becomes justified;" "The Record," continued the
Board in this conection, "is inconclusive as to whether or not this particular
type of lower-fare service is justified at this time."
Since there is ample evidence that the Board considered the incumbent
transpacific carriers unwilling to reduce fares, and furthermore believed
that such reductions could be made without jeopardizing the profitability
of these airlines, 7 its emphasis on fare proposals in the present proceeding
seems entirely in line with existing precedent.
C. Fares, Rates And Costs On The Pacific
In general, it would seem that the high rates of return earned by United
States-flag transpacific carriers are largely attributable to low operating
costs rather than to "high" prices-that is, that the general level of charges
on the Pacific, while high relative to costs in that area, is not extremely
out of line with charges in other areas. The following discussion will present some evidence which appears to support this view.
In past years, the level of passenger fares on the Pacific has been higher
than that on the North Atlantic. Both tourist and economy fares were
introduced in the former area some two years later than in the latter;
more recently, Pacific promotional fares have also tended to lag behind.
Partly on the basis of the evidence contained in Table III, the Board's
Bureau of Operating Rights has concluded that "inordinately high fares
prevail and yields are obtained throughout the area, except in respect to
41

14 C.A.B.

720

(1951).

"Id.

at 725 and 778.

4Id.

at 724.

"Reopened Hawaiian Case, 11 C.A.B. 1008 (1950).
"Id. at 1017.
41 See, for example, the testimony of Board Chairman Boyd in International Air Fares, Hearings
on H.R. 465 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation and Aeronautics of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., at 16 (1965):
The Board strongly urged U.S.-flag carriers attending the JATA meetings in Athens
for the purpose of negotiating worldwide fares for a two-year period beginning
April 1, 1965, to propose a substantial reduction in transpacific economy-class fares.
The U.S. transpacific carriers, however, made no effort whatsoever to achieve the
objectives sought by the Board, and the conference adjourned without producing an
agreement . . . . The proceedings of the IATA conference confirm the Board's belief
that no carrier, U.S. or foreign, will voluntarily reduce rates for this area.
See also the Board's statement at these Hearings at 39:
In the Pacific . . . we are convinced that substantial reductions can and must be
made and, in fact, are long overdue.
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United States-Hawaii, despite the fact that passenger hauls are among
the longest in the world.""8 However, there are obvious pitfalls involved
in judging relative fare levels by comparisons of individual yields for
trips of comparable length. For example, such comparisons do not reflect
the actual incidence of payment of the various types of fare available
between any two points; again, the particular choice of routes being compared can produce misleading results. In connection with Table III, it
should be noted that the United States-Caribbean fare level is relatively
very low, as compared with other areas; that United States-Hawaii is also
notably a low-yield route (both of these markets having been significantly
affected by nonscheduled competition, and the latter quite probably by
the threat of new scheduled competition in the Transpacific Route Case49) ;
and that fares applicable to trips involving United States transcontinental
segments or origins in the United States interior must to some extent reflect
the level of domestic fares on alternative carriers.
Somewhat the same inconclusiveness attaches to the low "break-even
passenger load factors" sometimes used as evidence of unduly high fares
on the Pacific. The "break-even passenger load factor," as defined by the
Board, is
The revenue passenger load factor in scheduled service that would have been
required for passenger revenues in addition to all other operating revenues
except subsidy to equal over-all operating expenses. This break-even load
factor is derived by dividing (1) revenue yield per passenger-mile in scheduled
service into (2) cost per available seat-mile determined after reducing overall operating expenses by an amount equal to operating revenues other than
those applicable to scheduled passenger service and subsidy."0
It is certainly true that break-even passenger load factors for United
States-flag carriers have reached extremely low levels in recent years: in
1966, for example, Northwest (International) and Pan American (Pacific) achieved break-even passenger load factors of 0.4 and 34 percent,
respectively, as compared with 43.6 percent for all international and territorial operations of United States combination (i.e., passenger-and-cargo)
carriers. When considered in conjunction with actual passenger load factors-53.3 percent for Northwest (International) and 63.8 percent for
Pan American (Pacific)S"-these figures surely show that these carriers
could have covered operating expenses at a far lower fare level than that
actually charged. However, as the Board's definition clearly indicates, it
is not possible on the basis of these figures immediately to recommend a
drastic fare reduction, since revenues other than passenger revenues are
taken as fixed in calculating the break-even passenger load factor. In
" Statement of Position and Summary Brief of the Bureau of Operating Rights to Examiner
Robert L. Park, CAB Docket No. 16242 et al., 28 July 1967, at 3. The Bureau here refers
specifically to Northwest's yield on the Seattle-Tokyo route, which, it says, "is among the highest,
if not the highest, in the world."
41 Supra note 2.
S Civil Aeronautics Board, Air Carrier Analytical Charts and Summaries, 12 Months Ended
31 Dec. 1966.
"Id. For the international and territorial operations of all United States combination carriers,
the figure was 58.2 percent.
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other words, it may well be that reductions in charges other than fares
should absorb all or a large part of any recommended change in the price
level. It would appear that the over-all rate of return on investment remains the best general indicator of the feasibility of price reduction, and
that the proper distribution of such a reduction among classes of traffic is
a matter of relative elasticities of demand and effect on average cost of
service.
As is shown in Tables IV and V, the Board's statistics of average passenger-mile yield and average passenger revenue per passenger revenue
ton-mile in recent years do not support the conclusion that these have
been exceptionally high on the Pacific; and the present writer's calculations
for 1966 indicate that a broadly similar relationship between Northwest
(International) and Pan American (Atlantic) continued in that year.
(This particular comparison is perhaps the most significant in the present
context, since figures for Pan American (Pacific) and (LAD) are deTABLE IV
PASSENGER YIELD PER REVENUE PASSENGER-MILE

(SCHEDULED

SERVICE),

SELECTED YEARS, 1959-1963
(CENTS PER MILE)
Calendar
Years

Northwest
(International)

Pan American
(Pacific)

Pan American
(Atlantic)

Pan American
(LAD)

1959
1961

6.91
6.95

6.21
5.72

7.67
7.21

5.23
5.37

1962

6.76

5.49

6.78

5.07

1963

6.33

5.30

6.72

5.26

SOURCE: Civil Aeronautics Board,

Yields and Costs per Revenue Ton-Mile, Passenger Yield
per Revenue Passenger-Mile, and Operating Expenses per Available Ton-Mile, Certificated Route Air Carriers, 12 Months Ended 31 December 1959, 1961, 1962, and
1963.

TABLE V
PASSENGER REVENUE PER REVENUE PASSENGER TON-MILE
(SCHEDULED SERVICE), SELECTED YEARS, 19 59-1966
(CENTS PER MILE)
Calendar
Years

Northwest
(International)

Pan American
(Pacific)

Pan American
(Atlantic)

Pan American
(LAD)

1959
1961

68.0
68.5

60.6
56.5

75.2
71.4

56.1
53.9

1962
1963
1966

66.6
62.7
56.4

54.3
52.5

67.3
66.8
57.1

50.4
52.2

SOURCES: Civil Aeronautics Board,

Yields and Costs per Revenue Ton-Mile, Passenger Yield
per Revenue Passenger-Mile, and Operating Expenses per Available Ton-Mile, Certificated Route Air Carriers, 12 Months Ended 31 December 1959, 1961, 1962, and
1963.
1966: Calculated from Civil Aeronautics Board, Air Carrier Financial Statistics,
12 Months Ended December, 1966, and Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, 12 Months
Ended December, 1966. (Total passenger revenue (scheduled) passenger revenue
ton-miles (scheduled).)
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pressed by exceptionally low yields in the United States-Hawaii and United
States-Caribbean markets, respectively.)
Moreover, the past year has seen significant fare reductions. In January, 1967, the 15 percent reduction in the one-way basic economy fare,
which had been put into effect for the winter months by an agreement
reached in May of 1966, was extended to include a greater portion of the
year, and provisions relating to travel at group fares were liberalized so
as to make them more widely available. In August, the carriers agreed on
further fare reductions which have been described by the Board as follows:
The subject agreement . . . [provides that] Round-trip economy fares between
the West Coast and Tokyo during the peak season will be reduced from
$760.00 to $722.00. The peak-season fares are to apply between July 1 and
October 31 for departures from the West Coast. A minimal reduction will
be offered in the off-season fares which apply during the balance of the year.
These fares for round-trip travel will be reduced from $703.00 to $684.00.
The current inclusive tour-basing fares available for individual travel will
be reduced during both the peak and off-seasons. During the peak season
inclusive tour travel fares will be reduced from $660.00 to $641.00. Offseason fares will be reduced from $603.00 to $584.00. The availability of
these fares will be subject to the requirement that the total price, including
air fares, be equivalent to the normal economy-class round-trip fares plus
$100.00 (this would require, West-Coast-Tokyo, the purchase of ground
accommodations with a minimum price of $200.00). Present affinity group
fares of $555.00 per person for groups of 25 or more, and $500.00 for groups
of 70 or more on West Coast-Tokyo round trips will be retained without a
change. Round-trip first-class fares West Coast-Tokyo will be cut by a
minimal amount of $19.00 from $1,235.00 to $1,216.00."
These fares became effective on 1 October 1967, for an intended period
of eighteen months. Later in the fall, agreement was reached on a lower
group inclusive tour fare, for a minimum of fifteen persons, to go into
effect 1 January 1968. According to Aviation Week, under these fares, a
"Typical 15-day package from the West Coast to Japan will be $1,048
compared with $1,098 for the lowest individual tour price available." 3
Though these reductions may be sufficient to maintain a fare level not
out of line with other comparable areas, they may well be insufficient,
even together with recent freight rate decreases, to produce rates of return
regarded as reasonable by the Board. Indeed, in the above-cited order (see
footnote 52), the agency stated its belief "that the carriers have substantial
financial leeway to offer reductions in the Pacific area greater than those
encompassed in the agreement," and noted that "the carriers have failed
to adopt an individual economy-class excursion fare of general application
throughout the Pacific area, such as applies on the North Atlantic, which
the Board has long urged." Such a fare, the Board held, "is economically
feasible for the carriers, . . . would serve to build tourism in Asia, and . . .
would serve as an adjunct to the various 'Visit U.S.A.' programs promoted
5' Agreements by Joint Conference of the International Air Transport Association relating to
North/Central Pacific Fares, CAB Docket No. 17828, CAB Order No. E-25666, 11 Sept. 1967.
"'AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY,

13 Nov. 1967, at 5O.
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by our domestic industry."
As measured by average freight revenues per freight revenue ton-mile,
cargo rates on the Pacific have been appreciably higher on the Pacific than
on the Atlantic (see Table VI). Like passenger fares, cargo rates have
been significantly reduced since mid-1965. In August of that year, after
failure of a spring traffic conference to reach agreement, Japan Air Lines
and Pan American initiated substantial reductions in specific commodity
rates and made other tariff revisions which amounted to effective reductions for certain types of traffic." The following spring, agreements were
reached which embodied the 1965 decreases and provided for certain other
minor changes. In approving this agreement for a limited period of time,
the Board noted that certain of these changes effected rate reductions, but
indicated lack of sympathy with certain others with the opposite effect.
These, the agency said, were unjustified in view of the recent tremendous
rise in the freight revenues of the United States-flag Pacific carriers." In
the spring of 1967, the carriers arrived at an agreement, effective 1 October
1967, which, among other changes, included important rate reductions on
the Pacific. Though the actual effect of these reductions cannot yet be
evaluated, the following account in International Aviation will give some
idea of their general impact:
Lower cargo rates agreed upon . . .in San Juan this spring ...entail cuts
of 15 percent in shipping costs from North America to the Far East via
the North and Central Pacific routes. In addition to a major reduction in
general cargo rates, a broad range of specific commodities to most points in
the Orient will benefit from reductions of more than 23 percent. In the eastbound direction across the North and Central Pacific, additionally reduced
developmental rates will offer shippers savings of from 32 to 44 percent." s
TABLE VI
AVERAGE FREIGHT REVENUE PER FREIGHT REVENUE TON MILE
(SCHEDULED

SERVICE),
(CENTS

SELECTED YEARS,

1959-1966

PER MILE)

Calendar
Years

Northwest
(International)

Pan American
(Pacific)

Pan American
(Atlantic)

Pan American
(LAD)

1959
1961
1962
1963
1966

40.9
39.5
36.2
37.8
26.0

39.7
32.7
30.1
29.2

37.9
29.7
26.4
27.8
21.2

25.6
26.1
25.7
26.5

SOURCES: 1959-1963: Civil Aeronautics Board, Yields and Costs Per Revenue Ton-Mile, Passenger Yield per Re'enuie Passenger-Mile, and Operating Expenses per Available
Ton-Mile, Certificated Air Carriers, 12 Months Ended 31 December 1959, 1961,
1962, and 1963.
1966: Computed from Civil Aeronautics Board, Air Carrier Traffic Statistics,
12 Months Ended 31 December 1966, and Air Carrier Financial Statistics, 12 Months
Ended 31 December 1966. (Freight revenues (scheduled) -- freight revenue tonmiles (scheduled).)
4 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9 Aug. 1965, at 37.
" INTERNATIONAL AVIATION, II Apr. 1966, at 66.
" 2 Oct. 1967, at 60. A more detailed description of these changes is contained in CAB Order
No. E-25527, 15 Aug. 1967.
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It was also here estimated that rate cuts on the North Atlantic would
amount to approximately 10 percent, "with several low developmental
specific commodity rates offering additional savings."
The Board approved these agreements while at the same time making
clear its opinion that further reductions were called for:
While the agreements incorporate some reductions on cargo traffic moving
via the North/Central Pacific, we would observe that the rate levels remain
higher than those applicable via the North Atlantic; but, there is no indication that transportation costs are higher. We are approving these agreements
since they do embrace reductions. This is a step in the right direction.
However, the Board believes that further reductions are warranted, and
expects that future I.A.T.A. negotiations will be directed toward achieving
this objective. 7
It is evident that the apparently higher level of freight rates on the
Pacific is not in itself sufficient to account for high rates of return in
this area, even with the remarkable freight traffic increase which has recently occurred. In 1966, freight revenue ton-miles for Northwest (International) were 98.7 percent higher than in 1965; for Pan American
(Pacific), the corresponding percentage was 38.4. Only 26.2 percent of
the former carrier's revenue ton-miles were freight in 1966, and only 22.1
percent of the later's."
TABLE VII
TOTAL OPERATING EXPENSES PER REVENUE TON-MILE,
SELECTED YEARS,

1959-1966

(CENTS PER MILE)
Calendar
Year

Northwest
(International)

Pan American
(Pacific)

Pan American
(Atlantic)

Pan American
(LAD)

1959
1961
1962
1963
1966

50.8
44.6
42.3
37.5
19.7

48.7
39.4
35.0
33.0
22.6

60.5
56.6
49.9
47.8
37.2

49.6
44.7
45.0
41.6

51.6

SOURCES: 1959-1963: Civil Aeronautics Board, Yields anti Costs per revenue Ton-Mile, Passenger Yield per Revenue Passenger-Mile, and Operating Expenses per Available
Ton-Mile, Certificated Air Carriers, 12 Months Ended 31 December 1959, 1961,
1962, and 1963.
1966: Computed from Civil Aeronautics Board, Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, 12
Months Ended 31 December 1966, and Air Carrier Financial Statistics, 12 Months
Ended 31 December 1966. (Over-all operating expenses over-all revenue tonmiles.)

The most important factor underlying the high Pacific rate of return
would appear to be relatively low operating costs per revenue ton-mile,
which are due in part to exceptionally long hauls and in part to the composition of the traffic. As Table VII shows, average expenses per revenue
ton-mile have been much lower than in other areas, and the inter-area
V Agreements by the International Air Transport Association relating to worldwide cargo rates,
CAB Docket No. 18650, CAB Order No. E-25527, 15 Aug. 1967.

a"Civil Aeronautics Board, Air Carrier Traffic Statistics, 12 Months Ended 31 December 1966.
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has widened in recent years. In 1962, for example, average
expenses for Northwest (International) and Pan American
were about 85 and 70 percent respectively of those for Pan
(Atlantic); in 1966, the corresponding percentages were about

53 and 61.

This very recent drop in relative costs on the Pacific has been associated
with the rise in freight traffic already mentioned and also with a phenomenal increase in mail revenue ton-miles. In 1966, mail revenue tonmiles for Pan American (Pacific) rose by 158 percent over 1965 to a
total of 296 million, or over 60 percent of that year's total for all international and territorial operations of United States combination carriers;
for Northwest (International), the 1965-1966 percentage increase was
36.3 percent to a total of over 51 million revenue ton-miles. For the latter
carrier, mail revenue ton-miles in 1966 represented 13.8 percent of its
over-all revenue ton-miles; for Pan American (Pacific) the corresponding
percentage was 29.2, as compared with less than 5 percent for all other
international and territorial operations of United States combination carriers (i.e., excluding the two transpacific operations)." The large proportional importance of this relatively low-cost traffic, moving in quantities
sufficient to fill a relatively high proportion of available space on scheduled
passenger flights, must contribute significantly to the profiability of the
transpacific carriers, even though present mail rates are some 10 percent
lower than those on the Atlantic." At least since the transfer of transpacific military mail to commercial carriers in the mid-'fifties, mail traffic
has been an important cause of the prosperity of the transpacific airlines. 1
59 id.

"°By CAB Order No. E-21458, 28 Oct. 1964, transatlantic and transpacific mail rates were
set at 40 cents and 36 cents per ton-mile, respectively. According to the Board, this action brought
about
a reduction of 25.2 percent from the . . . transatlantic service mail rate of 53.5
cents per mail ton-mile, a reduction of 22.5 percent in Northwest's . . . rate of
46.44 cents to Tokyo and beyond, and a composite reduction of about 34 percent in
Pan American's . . . transpacific rates of 46.44 cents to Tokyo and 66.05 cents to
other Pacific points.
The previous rates had been set in 1955, and reflected the higher operating costs prevailing at that
time.
61 Reopened Transpacific Certificate Renewal Case supra note 3, at 533:
Another of the more important changed circumstances which occurred since the
earlier hearing has been, in Pan American's opinion, the decision by the Department
of Defense, in the latter part of 1954, to use commercial carriers in the transportation of military mails across the Pacific . . . in fact both carriers did operate without
subsidy in the calendar year 1955 . . . . The importance of the military mail as a
revenue producer may be seen from the fact that in 1955 it accounted for 33 percent
of the total revenue received by Northwest and Pan American in operations between
the States and Tokyo. The addition of U.S. civil mail and foreign mail increases this
percentage appreciably.
And at 561:
The overall effect of the large upsurge in traffic being carried by Northwest and
Pan American has been to remove a subsidy burden from the taxpayer which in 1912
amounted to $12,691,000 ....
In 1955, subsidy payments for Northwest's international operations and Pan American's Pacific operations were completely eliminated.
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D. Problenis Of Market Forecasting
The Transpacific Route Investigation presents an extraordinarily difficult
and complex problem to the regulatory agency. Added to the usual uncertainties attending economic forecasting-such as those relating to the
probable course of the Vietnamese war, the United States balance of payments, and the state of world economic activity-are those related to the
future policies of other nations towards United States-flag airlines. While
foreign-flag competition on the Pacific has not developed to the extent
that it has on the Atlantic (a far larger market), there is already a great
deal of such competition; there will no doubt be more of it in the not too
distant future; and past experience with restrictionist policies in the Far
East is anything but reassuring. The most important elements in the present competitive set-up have been outlined as follows by the Board's Bureau
of Operating Rights:
The sole third and fourth freedom or primary [foreign-flag] carriers are as
follows:
CARRIER

COUNTRY

FAR EAST
Japan

(1) Japan Air Lines(2) Philippine Air Lines
(3)

(4)

Philippines

(Permit authority issued
but carrier not operating)

Korea

BOAC

United Kingdom

(1) Qantas

SOUTH PACIFIC
Australia

(2) Air New Zealand

New Zealand

(3) U.T.A.

France

PRIMARY TRAFFIC ROUTE

Japan-Honolulu-San
Francisco-New York
Philippines-HonoluluSan Francisco
Korea-Anchorage-Seattle
Hong Kong-HonoluluSan Francisco-New York
Australia-Honolulu-San
Francisco-New York
Ncw Zealand-HonoluluSan Francisco
Tahiti-Honolulu-Los
Angeles

The actual operations of these carriers are much more extensive in the area
because of fifth freedom and beyond homeland operations . . . . At present
BOAC's South Pacific route is the only trans-ocean fifth freedom operation.
Undoubtedly there will be more but they will become, as traffic grows, of
decreasing significance in markets served by primary carriers as are, for
example, fifth freedom operations in the North Atlantic primary markets."

The special significance of "primary traffic" carriers (i.e., those operating
between the home country and the United States) arises, of course, from
the ability of the home country to take restrictive action against competitors of other nationalities. There is reported to be an immediate prospect
of additional transpacific competition by Thai Airways International,
"2 Statement of Position and Summary Brief of the Bureau of Operating Rights to Examiner
Robert L. Park, 28 July 1967, at 17-18.
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which already operates between Bangkok and Tokyo and is said to be
planning to extend that route to Honolulu and Los Angeles "before the
end of 1968."'" The Thai Government has only recently removed a restriction which prevented TWA from carrying local Bangkok-Hong Kong
passengers," and could, of course, again impose such measures if its airline
fell upon evil days.
Because of the very great relative importance of Japan as origin and
destination of transpacific traffic, particular interest attaches to the probable policies of that nation towards foreign-flag competition. Recent reports indicate that "Japan Air Lines intends to seek capacity restrictions
for United States-flag carriers if results of the Transpacific Route [Investigation] jeopardize what it considers its fair share of the market." It is
further reported that JAL estimates its "fare share" as "one-third the
total number of passengers and one-third the total volume of cargo transported" between the United States and Japan in 1970 (as compared with
an estimated 38 percent at present) ; and that JAL's president would "like"
to see its share of United States bound traffic originating in Japan increase
from its present approximately 30 percent to "about one-half." According to the same official, "Japan has a reciprocal policy of exchanging schedules on an equal basis with all countries except the United States," though
it does not intend "to become that inflexible with the United States." Moreover, the Japanese Government is reported to encourage travel agents "to
give JAL all the business it can handle and then apportion the rest to
foreign flag carriers." On the specific question of new United States competitive authorizations, the Japanese official indicated that his country
would accept "'one large and possibly one small carrier,' provided the
two have separate routes so there can be more flexibility in regulating
capacity," the "small" carrier possibly being an all-cargo airline."
The Japanese Government did impose frequency restrictions on United
States airlines in the 195 0's," and more recently has limited the number of
all-cargo flights by Pan American which could discharge and pick up commercial cargo in Tokyo." The new bilateral agreement arrived at by Japan
and the United States late in 1965 requires that 60 days' notice be given
to the Japanese Government if the United States authorizes an additional
transpacific United States-flag carrier."
Other Far Eastern nations have also restricted the operations of United
States airlines. A study by the Civil Aeronautics Board provides the following description of certain restrictions existing in August, 1966:
Under the restrictions imposed by Indonesia, Pan American is not permitted
to carry Fifth Freedom (or local), stopover, or connecting air traffic beDjakarta and Singapore in either direction ....A passenger arriving by Pan
American may not, for example, get off at Singapore, visit the city and island,
63 AVIATION

WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 11 Dec. 1967.
WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 9 Oct. 1967, at 50.
"AVIATION
"5AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 11 Dec. 1967, at 49-50.

"0Transpacific Route Case supra note 2, at 1035.
67 AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, I May 1967, at 39.
68AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 3 Jan. 1966, at 27.
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and then go on to Djakarta on another Pan American flight. The Philippines
limits the United States to four frequencies per week .

.

. Northwest and

Pan American each operate two frequencies weekly to Manila, the maximum
allowed in total. Singapore, similar to Indonesia, does not allow Pan American
to carry local, stopover, or connecting traffic between Singapore and Manila
in either direction.6 '
The scope and impact of such restrictions is likely to vary inversely with
the prosperity of the national carrier at whose protection they are aimed.
If in the future traffic growth should taper off, or the number of carriers
in each market show an excessive increase, the effect of restrictive policies
on United States airlines could be serious indeed.
Other important unknowns affecting the future of the market are (1)
the future level of rates and fares and (2) the closely related matter of
the effect on airline economics of new equipment of high productivity
(e.g., the Boeing 747 and the supersonic transport) which will be coming
into use within a few years' time. In line with the Board's declared interest in lower prices, carrier applicants in the Transpacific Route Investigation, both combination and all-cargo, are offering a bewildering variety
of proposals for fare and rate reductions, accompanied by an array of
traffic forecasts reflecting largely conjectural notions of demand elasticity.
In view of the very large capacity of such aircraft as the 747, it is possible
that certain routes which could have supported multi-carrier service with
low-productivity aircraft may become unable to do so, despite an expected
decrease in available ton-mile costs.
E. The Extreme Complexity Of The Problems Of Choice
Of Routes And Carriers.
An outstanding characteristic of the Transpacific Route Investigation is
its large geographical scope and extreme complexity. The area covered in
the proceeding is bounded on the west by longitude 700 east, and on the
east by eastern coast of the United States, mainland China and the U.S.S.R.
being excluded. Also excluded from consideration is the question of "local"
service in the Pacific, i.e., "inter-island local air services in the South,
Central and West Pacific, notably among the islands comprising the U.S.
Trust Territories."7 Proposals under consideration in the Investigation are
those "involving service between the U.S. mainland on the one hand,
and Hawaii and other areas of the Pacific to be served directly or through
Hawaii, on the other hand." Services to non-United States Western Hemisphere points, except Mexico, were ruled out of the proceeding as not bearing "directly on the principal issue of United States-Pacific service.""
To make the proceeding manageable at all, it was necessary to place
some additional limits on proposals to be reviewed. To this end, the Board
designated twenty-five United States cities as possible co-terminals, "in a
69 Civil

Aeronautics Board, Tourism and the United States-Far East and Pacific Air Passenger

Market (Nov. 1966), at 31.
V"Transpacific Route Investigation, CAB Docket No. 16242, Order No. E-23740
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manner which gives due regard to their size, traffic-generating capacity,
and geographical location, ' '.. namely: Boston, Buffalo/Niagara Falls, New
York/Newark, Philadelphia, Pittsburgh, Washington, D.C., Baltimore (or
Washington/Baltimore), Chicago, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Minneapolis/St. Paul, St. Louis, Atlanta, Miami (or Miami/Fort Lauderdale),
Dallas (or Dallas/Fort Worth), Houston, New Orleans, Phoenix, Denver,
Los Angeles (or Los Angeles/Long Beach or Los Angeles/Burbank), San
Diego, San Francisco (or San Francisco/Oakland), Portland, and Seattle/
Tacoma. In addition, the Board announced that no new domestic operating
authority in the continental United States would be considered in this
proceeding.
A very large number of carriers have presented proposals to the Board.
Applicants include all the United States domestic trunklines except one
(Northeast), Pan American, one supplemental airline, one local-service
carrier, one Alaskan airline, and the three all-cargo air carriers. The possible combinations of routes and carriers which could be chosen from this
selection of proposals are evidently very numerous indeed.
Moreover, the factors which are relevant to the question of choice of
carrier are extraordinarily diverse and difficult (if not impossible) to reduce to some common denominator of "public interest." Among these
factors are: number and importance of designated United States coterminals served, experience on the Pacific (including contract operations
for MAC)," interest in and plans for aiding the development of tourism
in the area, experience in such development in this area and others, plans
for new equipment and willingness and ability to invest large sums in it,
and rate and fare proposals, as well as more usual considerations such as
need for correction of a weak route system, prospective diversion of revenue
from existing services, and "fairness" in the over-all allocation of new
routes.
Given the number of parties involved and the complexity of the issues,
the proceeding is and: must in the nature of the case be extremely timeconsuming and costly."' If the area involved were purely domestic, one
might have little hesitation in suggesting that the choice of new services
72Id. Here the Board states:
With minor exceptions necessitated by considerations of geographical balance, the
cities selected are in the top 25 cities from the standpoint of population, with metropolitan area populations of I million or more, and rank in the top 25 mainland
U.S. cities in terms of domestic passengers produced. These are the cities which can,
in fact, most realistically be related to foreseeable future service requirements.
73For fiscal 1965, the dollar value of MAC contracts on the Pacific was reported at $146.8
million; and the following carriers had contracts: Continental, Flying Tiger, Northwest, Pan
American, Seaboard World, Slick, Southern Air Transport, Trans-Caribbean, Trans-International,
World, and United. AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 27 Sept. 1965, at 37.
74The present writer has found only fragmentary data relating to the cost of the proceeding.
However, some idea of its magnitude can be obtained from the fact that during the formal hearings held in 1967 the Examiner was reported to have "collected 9,421 pages of transcript from
433 witnesses, including 18 airlines and 45 civic, city and state parties." (Washington Post, 29 July
1967.) In the earlier Transpacific Route Case supra note 2, Hawaiian Airlines alone was reported
to have spent $650,000 trying to get authorization to operate between Hawaii and the mainland
United States (AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 7 Nov. 1966, at 43). This authorization
was recommended by the Examiner but turned down by the Board.
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would be better left to the usual market mechanism. There is no reason
to suppose that all the present applicants, or, indeed, more than a very
few of them, would in fact put their proposals into effect if this were legally
and politically possible. What they are applying for is a position sheltered
by the certification process rather than an opportunity to compete in a
free market.
However, such a solution is not available in international air transportation. The United States Government is inevitably involved in the matter
of international air routes (as it is in the matter of international air rates
and fares) because other governments are involved. Without governmental
support, in the form of negotiations for rights to serve foreign points and
continued representation of the interests of the carriers, it is doubtful that
United States-flag airlines could enter foreign markets on a large scale or
defend themselves against the restrictive measures of foreign governments.
Again, it would not be feasible for the United States to attempt to support
all proposals for new United States-flag services; such a policy would obviously meet with little success abroad. Since services to be supported by
the United States Government cannot be chosen by experience in the
market (the market being effectively closed to carriers not already receiving
such support), some sort of administrative method of choice would appear
to be inevitable; it will continue to be needed as long as the present close
relationships persist between governments and their flag carriers throughout the world.

